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This article is about the problem of the jurisdictional dispute between the Constitu-
tional Court and the Supreme Court. It shows the origin of the historical perspective 
of the dispute, analyzing the mutual relations between both judicial authorities since 
the moment when the Constitutional Court was created and its course after the Con-
stitution of 1997 came into force. Possible solutions to the conflict between the two 
entities of highest judicial authority on a normative level were mentioned, in particu-









The Constitutional Court (hereinafter: CC) and the Supreme Court (herein-
after: SC) are the two judicial authorities whose judicature is of particular 
importance for the application of law by courts and that is why the relations 
between those entities are so significant. The need to protect the citizens’ 
trust in the rights has been repeatedly pointed out by the CC which indicated 
that “the whole social order, mutual coexistence of people, are unthinkable 
without taking into account the category of trust as a psychological and 
sociological element. It also relates to the field of law, if its rational nature is 
assumed. Confidence in law allows a citizen to plan and anticipate in the 
long term.”1 In its judicature the Supreme Court notes that the “uniformity 
                                                 
1 The ruling of the Constitutional Courts of 2nd March, 1993, ref. no. (K. 9/92). 




of judicial decisions undoubtedly exposes the legal certainty of law enforce-
ment,”2 because it should be remembered that the juridical aspects of the 
uniformity of court decisions are as important as the social ones, namely 
the uniformity of decisions in the public perception is an important value, 
because it is unthinkable for the citizens to accept that different decisions 
are passed on the basis of the same provisions of law.3 
Looking at the mutual relations between the CC and the SC, one cannot 
miss the conflict between these judicial authorities which has existed since 
the beginning of the establishment of a separate body responsible for the 
constitutionality of the law. A prime example of mutual antagonisms is the 
Constitutional Court's judgment of 27 October 2010 in which it condemned 
the resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 20 December 
2007, ref. no. (I KZP 37/07)4 and the resolution of seven judges of the Su-
preme Court dated 17 December 2009 which was given the power of the 
legal principle of interpretation concerning the judgments of the Constitu-
tional Court.5 However, due to the time frame set by the Editorial Board the 
analysis regards the relations between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court before the Constitution of the Republic of Poland came into 
force.6 
Looking at the relations between the CC and the Supreme Court, a ques-
tion arises of the origin of the dispute, its course and the possibilities for 
further cooperation between the two judicial authorities. An answer should 
be also found to the question of whether it is a dispute about who should 
bear the palm or a fundamental dispute over the application of law. 
 
Difficult beginnings of the coexistence of the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court 
 
When referring to history, it should be noted that the Supreme Court as       
a judicial authority which was set up on 18 July 1917 by the Provisional 
                                                 
2 Resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 5th May, 1992, ref. no. (Kw. 
Pr. 5/92). 
3 L. Leszczyński, Jednolitość orzecznictwa jako wartość stosowania prawa [w:] Jednoli-
tość orzecznictwa. Standard – instrumenty – praktyka. Materiały z konferencji naukowej 
Warszawa, red. M. Grochowski, M. Raczkowski, S. Żółtek, Warszawa 2015, p. 13. 
4 Constitutional Court's judgment of 27 October 2010, ref. no. K 10/08. 
5 Resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 17 December, 2009, ref. no. III 
PZP 2/09. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 (O.J.L. 1997 No. 78, 
item. 483). 





Council of the State of the Kingdom of Poland, whereas the Constitutional 
Court was established by the Act of 26 March 1982 on Amending the Con-
stitution of the Polish People’s Republic7 and in reality the CC actually oper-
ated since 1 January 1986. In the context of this subject, one should first 
outline the evolution of the political position of the Supreme Court over the 
decades. Moreover, what seems interesting is the Supreme Court’s judges’ 
opinion on the necessity to establish a new body which is the CC as well as 
the beginning of its functioning until the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland came into force in 1997. 
In the interwar period, in the absence of a body such as the CC, the Su-
preme Court found some unconstitutional acts which were refused binding 
force by the highest judicial authority and some unconstitutional acts which 
were considered to be still in force.8 According to Art. 51, paragraph. 1 of 
the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic,9 the Supreme Court was 
the main judicial authority and it supervised the activities of all other courts 
regarding judgments. On the other hand, under the Act on the Supreme 
Court of 1962,10 this court is the supreme body in the system of the entire 
Polish judiciary system which governed the Social Insurance Court, and the 
Military Chamber of the Supreme Court took over the powers of the Su-
preme Military Court.11 The Act on the Supreme Court adopted in 198412 
stipulated that this authority is the supreme judicial body of the Polish Peo-
ple’s Republic which supervises the activities of other courts regarding 
judgments. Even this short description clearly indicates the privileged posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in the system of judicial power and it is no won-
der that over the years the Supreme Court got used to the fact that Roma 
locuta, causa finita. 
Under the ruling of March Constitution13 and April Constitution14 there 
was no authority responsible for the judicial supervision of the constitu-
tionality of the law, whereas during the Polish People’s Republic a negative 
                                                 
7 O.J.L. of 1982, no. 11, item 83. 
8 M. Zbrojewska, Rola i stanowisko prawne Sądu Najwyższego w procesie karnym, War-
szawa 2013, pp. 15–16. 
9 The Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic adopted by the Legislative Sejm on 
22nd July, 1952 (O.J.L. 1952, no. 33, item 232). 
10 The Act of 15th February, 1962 on the Supreme Court (O.J.L. 1962, no. 11 item 54). 
11 S. Włodyka, Funkcje Sądu Najwyższego, Kraków 1965, p. 25. 
12 The Act of 20th September, 1984 on the Supreme Court (O.J.L. 1984, no. 45, item 241). 
13 The Act of 17th March, 1921 – The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (O.J.L, 
1921, no. 44, item 267). 
14 The constitutional law of 23rd April, 1935 (O.J.L. 1935, no. 30, item 227). 




attitude to judicial supervision dominated due to the fact that the model of 
constitutional supervision assumed that the value of legal norms depended 
on its relation to the accepted norm of higher order. This solution led to 
eliminating unconstitutional legal acts from the legal system.15 The de-
mands for the establishment of a constitutional judiciary in the Polish legal 
system were brought up by the representatives of the doctrine already in 
the 1970s, however, it was not until the breakthrough of 1980 that it was 
possible for the proposals to establish a body empowered to control the 
constitutionality of the law to take real shape.16 
By choosing a model of control of the constitutionality of the law in Po-
land, a system of control could be adopted from the English model, where 
the supervision is conducted by the common courts; in one variation of this 
model there is a separate SC control chamber of the constitutionality of the 
law. In the USA, within 8 years of the introduction of the Constitution,17 the 
Supreme Court was granted the power to control the constitutionality of 
the federal Constitutions,18 treaties and federal laws. The other model as-
sumes an organizationally and functionally separate body whose main ob-
jective is to control the constitutionality of the law.19 
The idea of establishing a separate body responsible for the control of 
the constitutionality of the law was firmly opposed by the First President of 
the Supreme Court – Włodzimierz Berutowicz. He used his influence in the 
Politburo of the Communist Party to entrust the Chamber of the Supreme 
Court with the control of the constitutionality of the law.20 The skepticism 
about the need for the functioning of the CC as a separate body of the judici-
ary system was also expressed by the First President of the Supreme Court 
– Adam Strzembosz who argued primarily that some of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court21 were appointed by the previous power. 
Prof. Andrzej Zoll rightly notes that the formation of the CC was a failure 
of the concept according to which the Supreme Court’s reputation was to be 
boosted by entrusting it with the tasks in the area of monitoring legisla-
                                                 
15 S. M. Przyjemski, Spory kompetencyjne między organami sprawującymi wymiar spra-
wiedliwości w Polsce, Warszawa 2009, p. 44. 
16 L. Garlicki, Prawo konstytucyjne – zarys wykładu, Warszawa 2006, p. 361. 
17 R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, Prawotwórcze znaczenie orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 
w orzecznictwie Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, Warszawa 2010, p. 15. 
18 B. Banaszak, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2008, p. 107. 
19 R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, op. cit., p. 16. 
20 A. Zoll, Trybunał Konstytucyjny i Sąd Najwyższy, [in:] Trybunał Konstytucyjny – Księga 
XV-lecia, red. F. Saddler, A. Jankiewicz, Warsaw 2001, p. 93. 
21 Idem, Zollowie – opowieść rodzinna, Kraków 2011, p. 400. 





tion.22 It seems that the system of omnipotence of the Supreme Court, which 
existed from the beginning of its creation in 1917 until the CC started to 
operate in the legal system, was supposed to be maintained. 
At the moment of creation of the CC as an organ independent from the 
Supreme Court W. Berutowicz saw the need to develop the mutual relations 
between the two judicial authorities in such a way as to maintain the com-
pliance with the Constitution and internal consistency of the entire legal 
system. As history would show, the development of mutual relations is         
a long-term process full of numerous disputes between the CC and the SC.23 
The first fundamental dispute between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court occurred already in 1995 on the matter concerning the pos-
sibility of pursuing by the officers of uniformed services claims for payment 
of interest for delays in payment of salaries. In its resolution of 25 January 
199524 the Constitutional Court, presiding in its full composition, ruled that 
the failure to pay salaries to the uniformed officer is a delay in the fulfill-
ment of monetary performances, justifying, pursuant to Art. 481 § 1 of the 
Civil Code, the claim for interest before the common court. However, four 
months later the Supreme Court in the resolution adopted by seven judges25 
ruled that the court procedure to pursue the claim by the police officer be-
fore a common court together with interest is inadmissible. It should be 
noted that the right of the CC in the scope of the universally binding statutory 
interpretation encroaches on the Supreme Court competences since the 
competence of the CC corresponded to the institution of the Supreme Court 
explaining questionable legal provisions or those whose use caused dis-
crepancies in court judicature, so the powers of the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court crossed in this area, so did also the entities which 
may have initiated the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court.26 
As Professor Andrzej Stelmachowski rightly pointed out, the position 
taken by the Supreme Court in the resolution referred to above did not re-
sult from not knowing the CC’s judgment but from the frontal polemic with 
it in terms of binding the Supreme Court and courts of general jurisdiction 
as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. On the basis of this dispute Pro-
                                                 
22 Idem, Trybunał Konstytucyjny…, op. cit., p. 93. 
23 W. Berutowicz, Sąd Najwyższy w Polsce Ludowej, „Nowe Prawo” 1985, nr 5, p. 21. 
24 The resolution of the Constitutional Court dated 25th January, 1995, ref. no. W 14/94. 
25 The resolution of the Supreme Court dated 26th May, 1995, ref. no. Act I PZP 13/95. 
26 B. Szmulik, Pozycja ustrojowa Sądu Najwyższego w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, War-
szawa 2008, pp. 212–213. 




fessor Stelmachowski submitted a de lege ferenda postulate for the CC to 
comply with the standards of the rule of law and hold that the rulings on the 
universally binding interpretation of the law are in force from the date of 
their publication in the Official Journal of Laws. According to Professor Stel-
machowski, this solution will reduce tensions between the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court because it would not lead to an undermining 
of the Supreme Court rulings already rendered.27 
Another dispute of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court con-
cerned the meaning of the term “the territory of the Polish State” in the so-
called February Act.28 In its resolution of 30 April 199629 the Constitutional 
Court ruled that Art. 8 paragraph 2a of the February Act refers to – taking 
into account the specified circumstances – “the Polish land” included in the 
territory of the Polish State on 1 January 1944, so also to that part of the 
territory of the Polish State which was located east of the so-called Curzon 
Line according to the borderline agreed in the Treaty of Riga of 18 March 
1921. This position received a lot of academic criticism.30 However, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the territory of the Polish State shall be construed as 
it is in its present borders. The then President of the CC, Professor Zoll tried 
to appease the conflict and suggested a meeting of the judges of the Consti-
tutional Court with the judges of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
however, this meeting did not bring any results.31 
There was also some misunderstanding around the competence of the 
President of the Constitutional Court to declare the loss of the binding pow-
er by the provision which the ruling of the Constitutional Court concerned 
in the absence of a reaction of the Sejm. It was indicated that the resolution 
of the CC did not fall within the limits of the interpretation of the Act which 
was an encroachment on the powers of the legislature.32 
                                                 
27 A. Stelmachowski, Sąd Najwyższy kontra Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Przegląd Sądowy” 
1996, nr 2, pp. 4, 9. 
28 The Act of 23rd February, 1991 on recognizing as null and void the judgments issued 
against persons persecuted for their activities on behalf of an independent Polish state 
(O.J.L. 1991, no. 34, item. 149). 
29 The resolution of the Constitutional Court dated 30th April, 1996, ref. no. W 18/95. 
30 See e.g. the critical voices: L. Paprzycki, The Commentary to the resolution of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal dated 30th April, 1996, W 18/95, „Palestra” 1996, nr 9–10, p. 204;   
W. Czapliński, Glosa do uchwały TK z dnia 30 kwietnia 1996 r., W 18/95, „Państwo i Prawo” 
1996, nr 11, pp. 103–106. 
31 A. Zoll, Zollowie…, op. cit., p. 401. 
32 Idem, Trybunał Konstytucyjny…, op. cit., p. 94. 





It should be noted that previous attempts at cooperating between the CC 
and the SC failed because of the lack of good will. That was the case when 
Professor Zoll was the President of the CC and he suggested a meeting of the 
judges of the Constitutional Court with the judges of the Criminal Chamber of 
the Supreme Court to try to resolve the conflicts that occurred in their mu-




When the Constitution of 1997 came into force the CC lost the right to make 
universally binding interpretations of the statutes and since then the rulings 
of the CC have been final and cannot be waived by the Sejm and so some 
normative causes of the conflicts between the CC and the SC went down in 
history. Then a question arises about the nature of the cooperation between 
the two judiciary entities in the present normative state. After more than 
two decades of mutual coexistence of the CC and the SC, have they developed 
a specific framework for cooperation and established a uniform judicature 
or there is still a dispute between the two entities which sometimes calms 
down only to explode in a moment with an even greater intensity? 
The lasting dispute between the CC and the SC in the long perspective 
will damage the trust of the citizens in legal certainty and stability of law.    
It also gives rise to problems of judicature in the courts of lower instances 
and it lowers the reputation of the judicial system. Furthermore, the dispute 
is not about who should bear the palm – the Constitutional Court or the Su-
preme Court – but this is a dispute of fundamental importance for the func-
tioning of a coherent legal system. 
Will the vision of Wojciech Szpara come true? The lawyer wrote 
 
I can see it in my imagination – judges passing judgments in the first or second in-
stance, sitting somewhere at night with rings under their eyes and wondering over 
another coffee which judicature they should rely on: that of the Supreme Court or the 
Constitutional Court. I can see myself too, strenuously elaborating a topic and drafting 
a legal opinion and I can see clients to whom I will not be able to explain why I am 
actually not able to clearly explain some legal issues. It is possible also that lawyers 
will have problems with the interpretation of conflicting rulings in cases in which the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court get in each other’s way!34 
 
                                                 
33 Ibidem, p. 95. 
34 W. Szpara, Sąd Najwyższy kontra Trybunał Konstytucyjny, [online] http://adwokat-
woj-szpara.firmy.net/aktualnosci.html?n=9P43[accesed: 15.06.2015]. 




De lege ferenda – we should return to the demand to settle in the Consti-
tution the relations between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, 
in particular the scope of exclusive cognition of the Constitutional Court to 
rule on the constitutionality of laws and also, and perhaps most importantly, 
binding of the Supreme Court by the findings included in the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court.35 On the other hand, Jerzy Jaskiernia notes that the dis-
pute between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court has the char-
acteristic features of a conflict of competence which the Constitution does not 
account for, and that is why it should be amended or the relevant laws on 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court should be amended.36 
The words of Ronald Dwornik should also be remembered, as he said that 
“the courts are the capitals of the law, and the judges are its princes”37 and 
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